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Abstract: This paper introduces foundations for a new kind of cosmol-
ogy. We advocate that computer simulations are needed to address two key
cosmological issues. First, the robustness of the emergence of complexity, which
boils down to ask: “what would remain the same if the tape of the universe
were replayed?” Second, the much debated fine-tuning issue, which requires
to answer the question: “are complex universes rare or common in the space
of possible universes?” We argue that computer simulations are indispensable
tools to address those two issues scientifically. We first discuss definitions of
possible universes and of possible cosmic outcomes – such as atoms, stars, life
or intelligence. This leads us to introduce a generalized Drake-like equation,
the Cosmic Evolution Equation. It is a modular and conceptual framework to
define research agendas in computational cosmology. We outline some studies of
alternative complex universes. However, such studies are still in their infancy,
and they can be fruitfully developed within a new kind of cosmology, heav-
ily supported by computer simulations, Artificial Cosmogenesis. The appendix
[section 9] provides argumentative maps of the paper’s main thesis.
Keywords: artificial cosmogenesis, cosmic evolution, computational cos-
mology, digital physics, Drake equation, Cosmic Evolution Equation, robust-
ness, fine-tuning, multiverse.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
20
5.
14
07
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.ge
n-
ph
]  
7 M
ay
 20
12
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Possible Universes 4
3 Possible Cosmic Outcomes 5
4 Robustness in Cosmic Evolution 7
5 Artificial Cosmogenesis
or the study of alternative cosmic evolutions 11
6 Summary 17
7 Conclusion 19
8 Acknowledgments 20
9 Appendix - Argumentative Maps 20
What I cannot create I do not understand
On Richard Feynman’s blackboard
at time of death in 1988, as reported in [29]
1 Introduction
I am fond of both computer science and cosmology. However, the methods,
concepts and tools used in those two disciplines are very different. Is it possible
to unite this dual passion? This essay outlines foundations for such a new kind
of cosmology, Artificial Cosmogenesis.
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish three kinds of science: deterministic,
probabilistic and computational. Deterministic science can roughly be charac-
terized by the science Newton practiced. He used physical laws and initial
conditions to predict the future and explain the past. The predictions are of
an amazing accuracy and the tools used are mathematical equations which are
relatively easy to solve. Because of its successes, it is often implicitly considered
the typical model of hard science.
However, when there are too many particles in a system, their sheer number
and interactions make the Newtonian approach weak. In fact, even with only
three gravitational bodies the Newtonian theory of gravitation fails to make
practically useful predictions. The main insight of the founders of statistical
physics was to average out the interactions of particles to derive statistical laws
of behavior, such as the laws of thermodynamics or quantum mechanics.
In recent years, Laurent Nottale generalized this statistical predictability to
all scales in nature, by unifying relativity theories with microphysics (see e.g.
[41, 42, 43]). This scale relativity theory constitutes a revolution in progress
in the domain of theoretical physics, since its leads to fundamental theoretical
results as well as highly precise and validated predictions (see also [63], p96-97).
But what if our statistical methods also fail or are absent? What if we do not
know any way to predict the behavior of a very complex system? An even more
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general approach is needed. This can be done in a computational view of nature,
by theorizing and experimenting with algorithms (see e.g. [71, 70]). The field of
Artificial Life constitutes a remarkable application of this view, when it attempts
to decipher the most general laws of life, and then to implement and experiment
with them in computers. Stephen Wolfram [69] argued at length how important
this new kind of science based on computer simulations is. He advocated a
wide exploration of simple programs, to study their behavior and properties.
He argued that such a new approach is unavoidable if we want to understand
complex dynamics. As a matter of fact, the study of complex dynamical systems
will in most cases not be predictable with simple equations. Wolfram [68, 69]
further conjectured that most systems in nature are computationally irreducible.
This means that to study complex systems, there is no shorter way than to run
step by step the model, and study how it behaves (see also [72] for a general
formal definition of irreducible computation). Such a kind of science can still
make predictions because simulations can be run faster than reality. Studying
complex systems, equations won’t help, simulations will.
Of course, when possible, it is best to aim for absolute and precise predictions
such as in Newtonian science. When this fails, statistical laws are the second
best option. But most real and complex systems may not be predictable in
these two ways. A broader general computational exploration promises to be
the way to understand the rise and evolution of complexity.
My aim in this paper is to propose a computational approach to progress
on two arduous cosmological issues. First, the robustness of the emergence of
complexity in our universe; second, the question of how fine-tuned our universe
is.
The question of the robustness of the emergence of complexity can simply be
illustrated by a thought experiment. What would remain the same if we would
replay the tape of the universe? To address this issue, we introduce the Cosmic
Evolution Equation (CEE). It is a modular conceptual framework to discuss
possible universes, possible cosmic outcomes, the robustness of the universe and
fine-tuning. To define it, we build on Drake’s [19] equation in the Search for
Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) and on the thoughtful discussion of possible
universes by Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger [23].
The fine-tuning issue is much debated and intricate. The problem is that if
we vary one by one a number of parameters, both in cosmological and standard
particle models, no life or no complexity of any sort emerges (see e.g. [35, 44,
16]). The issue is mined with logical and probabilistic fallacies (e.g. [39, 14]) as
well as physical fallacies (see e.g. [64, 67, 53]). It is also commonly confused with
other related issues such as free parameters, parameter sensitivity, metaphysical
issues, anthropic principles, observational selection effects, teleology and God’s
existence [67].
Additionally, different discussions of fine-tuning focus on very different cos-
mic outcomes. We see fine-tuning discussions regarding the dimensionality of
space [44], the production of carbon atoms in stars [30], the existence of long-
lived stars [1]; the number of black holes [49]; biochemistry [5]; but also complex-
ity of any sort [20]. A key question to clarify the issue is thus to explicitly ask:
fine-tuning for what? Which cosmic outcome are we interested in? In particular,
we will see that most fine-tuning arguments are poor, since they vary parameters
one by one, which is a fallacy resulting in exploring only 0.00000000000000456
% of the parameter space under consideration!
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To remedy this situation, we generalize the CEE. The Drake equation esti-
mates the number of communicative intelligent civilizations in our galaxy. By
extension, one application of the generalized CEE is to estimate the likelihood
of our particular universe in the space of possible universes. In other words, if
Drake’s equation allows to estimate the probability of life existing “somewhere
in the galaxy”; one application of the CEE is to estimate the more general prob-
ability of life existing “anywhere in the space of possible universes”. Artificial
Cosmogenesis – ACosm for short – is the study of alternative cosmic evolutions
and allows in principle to assess how fine-tuned our universe is.
We first discuss the issues of possible universes and possible cosmic outcomes
(sections 2 and 3). Then we introduce the CEE to discuss the robustness issue
(section 4) and generalize the CEE to address the fine-tuning issue (sections 5
to 6). By bridging the gap between computer science and cosmology, I hope
this framework will fruitfully pave the way for resolving these two fundamental
cosmological issues.
2 Possible Universes
What are the possible universes? How can we describe the space of possible
universes? These questions raise enormous logical, metaphysical, philosophical,
and scientific problems. Although possible universes or possible worlds have
been discussed throughout in the history of philosophy (see e.g. [34, 36], see
also [18] for a wider historical perspective), our aim here is to formulate the issue
of possible universes so that it can progressively leave the realm of metaphysics
and enter operational science.
We now follow Ellis’, Kirchner’s and Stoeger’s [23] definition of the class of
all possible universes. Let M be a structural and dynamical space of all possible
universes m. Each universe m is described by a set of states s in a state space
S. Each universe m is characterized by a set P of distinguishing parameters
p, which are coordinates on S. Such parameters will be logical, physical or
dynamical. How will they dynamically evolve? The three authors elaborate:
Each universe m will evolve from its initial state to some final state
according to the dynamics operative, with some or all of its param-
eters varying as it does so. The course of this evolution of states
will be represented by a path in the state space S, depending on the
parametrisation of S. Thus, each such path (in degenerate cases a
point) is a representation of one of the universes m in M . The co-
ordinates in S will be directly related to the parameters specifying
members of M .
In such a procedure, we face a first major issue:
Possibility space issue: What delimits the set of possibilities?
What is the meta-law or meta-cause which determines M?
As the three authors argue, we can’t avoid the meta-law issue, because otherwise
we have no basis to set up a consistent description of M . We need to have a logic
which describes M . There are other difficult issues related to identifying which
different representations represent the same universe models – the equivalence
problem – and the problem of dealing with an infinite space of possible universes.
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I refer the reader to the three authors’ paper for more in depth discussions of
these issues.
More directly related to the fine-tuning issue is the remark of Jean-Philippe
Uzan that “the larger the possibility space considered, the more fine-tuned the
actual universe appears to be” (in [23], p923). Indeed, we can easily increase the
unlikelihood of our universe simply by allowing the parameter space to grow.
You could ask for example, did you explore if universes with 42 dimensions
generate life? Do we really want to capture the radical idea of “all that can
happen, happens”? There is much variation in the space of possibility we want to
delimit. Ellis ([21], p1261) distinguishes four levels of variation, weak, moderate,
strong and extreme:
• “Weak variation: e.g. only the values of the constants of physics are
allowed to vary? This is an interesting exercise but is certainly not an im-
plementation of the idea ‘all that can happen, happens’. It is an extremely
constrained set of variations.
• Moderate variation: different symmetry groups, or numbers of dimensions,
etc. We might for example consider the possibility landscapes of string
theory [24] as realistic indications of what may rule multiverses [24, 55, 56].
But that is very far indeed from ‘all that is possible’, for that should
certainly include spacetimes not ruled by string theory.
• Strong variation: different numbers and kinds of forces, universes without
quantum theory or in which relativity is untrue (e.g. there is an aether),
some in which string theory is a good theory for quantum gravity and
others where it is not, some with quite different bases for the laws of
physics (e.g. no variational principles).
• Extreme variation: universes where physics is not well described by math-
ematics; with different logic; universes ruled by local deities; allowing
magic as in the Harry Potter series of books; with no laws of physics at
all? Without even mathematics or logic?”
We indeed need to make a choice between theoretical physics and magic... or
anything in between.
Do we need to assume an actual multiverse? No we do not. To study the
fine-tuning issue, we need only possible or virtual universes, not actually realized
ones. This interpretation still allows us to use the vast multiverse literature to
define and explore possible universes, without making strong and problematic
ontological claims regarding their actual existence.
3 Possible Cosmic Outcomes
Once we settle on a framework to define possible universes, a second major issue
is to specify the parameters which differentiate possible universes:
Cosmic outcomes issue: What are the cosmic outcomes? What
are the milestones of cosmic evolution? What parameters differenti-
ate possible universes? How do we find those parameters?
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As the three authors mention, the values of the parameters may not be known
initially. They may emerge out of transitions from one regime to another. For
example, sociologists do not explore alternative sociological structures by vary-
ing the mass of elementary particles. They start from different, less fundamental
parameters, such as the influence of population density, the climate or the me-
dia. The challenge to understand complexity transitions in cosmic evolution is
of upmost importance and difficulty. For example, how did atoms emerge out
of the big bang era? How did planets form out of stars and stardust? How did
life originate out of molecules? How did consciousness emerge from biological
organisms? Etc.
The ideal of reducing such parameters is a major goal of science. The objec-
tive is to build a consistent theory and narrative of cosmic evolution, which ex-
plains a maximum of cosmic outcomes with a minimum of parameters. Scientific
progress is achieved when new theories capture previously free and unexplained
parameters (see e.g. [64] for an illustration in physics). We could now extend
this attitude to attempt a reduction of other higher parameters (such as life) to
fundamental physics and cosmic parameters. However, since we are still very
far from such a feat, in our description of possible universes we must assume
explicitly higher parameters. Typically, when researchers tackle the issue of the
origin of life, they don’t start from big bang nucleosynthesis, but they assume
the existence of molecules.
Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger categorize the parameters from the most basic
ones to the most complex ones. They distinguish different categories of param-
eters pj , with j = 1−2 describing basic physics; j = 3−5 describing cosmology
and a category of parameters j = 6 − 7 related to the emergence of life and
higher complexity.
Each category pj is composed of different parameters i. For example, p1(i)
are basic physics parameters, such that the fine-structure constant; masses,
charges and spins of particles, as well as other dimensionless parameters. I
refer the reader to the detailed description of the parameters given by the three
authors.
However, in each parameter category I would like to add explicitly some ran-
dom, chance or noise parameters. For example, these could include for j = 1−5
quantum effects in the early universe; or nonlinear chaotic dynamics which might
trigger catastrophic events, such as meteorites impacting planets for j = 7. This
would certainly complicate the dynamics, but would also make it much more
realistic. A dynamical argument can even be advanced that such random events
might be essential to the open-ended growth of complexity. An illustration can
be found in engineering with the heuristic of simulated annealing. It starts by
adding important noise into the system, and then gradually reduces it. The
purpose of the noise is to shake the system to reach a maximally stable config-
uration.
Now, how do we decide which cosmic outcomes to keep, and which ones
to leave out? At first, we can aim at including a maximum of parameters.
Then, we would progressively reduce the number of parameters, as we get better
and better insights on how they emerge from more fundamental principles and
theories; i.e. from previous parameters. Robert Aunger ([3], p1142-1144) did
compile from many authors a list of more than 100 different cosmic outcomes.
This is the most comprehensive review I am aware of, ranging from the big
bang, the formation of atoms, stars, solar systems, life, DNA, multicellularity,
6
sexual reproduction, fishes, to mammals, agriculture, modern science and space
exploration.
However, we can already anticipate a fallacy lurking when considering a large
list of cosmic outcomes. Similarly to Uzan’s remark for the space of possible
universes, we can note that the more cosmic outcomes we have, the more unlikely
they will seem. The extreme case is to consider one single object as a cosmic
outcome. For example, in intelligent design discussions, they consider a complex
object (like a living organism or an airplane) and try to assess the likelihood that
it arose by chance. Of course this will be very unlikely! Additionally, as Dawkins
[17] argues, natural selection would still constitute a much better candidate
explanation than design. A scientist will look for possible mechanisms, theories,
which can explain the emergence of complexity. The a posteriori probability
of a single object isolated from its evolutionary or human context is of weak
scientific interest.
To avoid such an error, we need to advance theoretical reasons to select
certain cosmic outcomes and not others. This is rarely attempted. Most authors
propose an arbitrary list without strong theoretical justification. Ellis, Kirchner
and Stoeger did not justify their choice of distinguishing parameters; although
it is clear that they included a lot of cosmological parameters necessary for their
subsequent study of alternative universes with different geometries.
The most promising avenue of research is to focus on thermodynamics (see
e.g. [47]). Indeed, all systems need to process energy, which is therefore a
universal concept, applicable from the beginning of the universe to our energy
hungry technological society. Robert Aunger [3, 4] built on a thermodynamical
theory to select cosmic outcomes, non-equilibrium steady-state transitions. Each
transition involves first an energy innovation, then a structural adjustment and
finally a new control mechanism. He thus constructed a consistent selection of
cosmic outcomes and evolutionary transitions.
Which cosmic outcomes are contingent and evolutionary? Which ones are
necessary and developmental? Are there attractors in the dynamic of cosmic
evolutionary development? To answer these issues, we need to explore the
robustness of the emergence of complexity. Stated otherwise, if we would re-run
the tape of the universe, would galaxies, stars, biology and technology arise again
and again? The straightforward way to answer those question, in parallel to a
theoretical rationale like Aunger’s, is indeed to re-run the tape of the universe.
Let us now examine how we can conceptualize and do that.
4 Robustness in Cosmic Evolution
what would remain the same if the tape of life were replayed?
Stephen Jay Gould [25]
what would remain the same if the tape of the universe were replayed?
Paraphrasing Gould’s question to the universe [62]
Answering this latter question, Paul Davies ([15], p317) wrote that if “the
universe were re-run a second time, there would be no solar system, no Earth
and no people. But the emergence of life and consciousness somewhere and
somewhen in the cosmos is, I believe, assured by the underlying laws of nature.”
Those claims, as Davies acknowledges, are only informed intuitions. How can
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we test this intuition or different ones scientifically? This is the issue of the
robustness of the emergence of complexity in cosmic evolution.
A first analysis of the tape metaphor shows its limits. Indeed, if the tape and
its player were perfect, we should get exactly the same results when re-running
the tape. So, the thought experiment would be trivial. Yet if our universe self-
constructs, one question is whether small fluctuations, chance events, noise or
random perturbations would lead to slightly different outcomes, or very different
ones. This makes the issue of robustness in cosmic evolution highly stimulating.
It is very hard to tackle because it is linked to a great weakness of cosmology
as a science: it has only one object of study, our unique universe. More precisely,
we can distinguish two fundamental limitations that Ellis ([21], 1216) pointed
out:
Thesis A1: The universe itself cannot be subjected to phys-
ical experimentation. We cannot re-run the universe with the
same or altered conditions to see what would happen if they were
different, so we cannot carry out scientific experiments on the uni-
verse itself. Furthermore,
Thesis A2: The universe cannot be observationally com-
pared with other universes. We cannot compare the universe
with any similar object, nor can we test our hypotheses about it by
observations determining statistical properties of a known class of
physically existing universes.
Our thesis is that it is possible to address those limitations and the issue
of robustness by running computer simulations of our universe. It is important
to note that if we replay the tape of our universe, we don’t aim to actually
explore the full space of possible universes. Here, we only aim to assess the ro-
bustness of the emergence of the different cosmic outcomes. We thus vary only
nondeterministic dynamical parameters we discussed above (quantum mechan-
ical effects, random perturbations, nonlinear chaotic dynamics, etc.). An open
question is also how we vary the random parameters. How often? How strong
is the variation? Various distributions can be tested, from Gaussian distribu-
tions, where most random variations are of an average strength, few are weak or
strong; to power-law distributions, where there are few very strong variations,
some medium variations, and most of the time weak random variations.
Because of the inclusion of such parameters, it makes sense to re-run the
same universe simulation. By running a multitude of times the simulation, it
will be possible to make statistics on the emergence of complexity. An even more
straightforward way to make such statistics would be to drastically intensify
astrobiology – the search for extraterrestrials. If or when we will find extrater-
restrials, we would be able to progressively study the “natural re-runs” of com-
plexity, elsewhere than on Earth. Additionally, searching for extraterrestrials
more complex than us would force us to break with the implicit anthropocen-
tric assumption that life and humans on Earth are the highest development in
cosmic evolution. This invites us to speculate on the existence of higher cosmic
outcomes, and this opens the way to test our theories of the general evolution of
cosmic complexity (see e.g. [10, 65] for modern views on the search for advanced
extraterrestrials).
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An example of ambitious simulations of our universe are the Millennium
run simulations [50, 9, 27]. The authors studied the formation, evolution and
clustering of galaxies and quasars within the standard (or concordance) model of
cosmology. Although they did not run the same simulation in its full complexity
many times, the volume space explored is large enough to extract meaningful
statistical properties on the evolution of the distribution of matter.
Replaying the tape of our entire universe is still a much more ambitious
project, which at present remains unrealistic. We should remain aware that
our current models and their associated free parameters are most likely not the
ultimate ones. Of course, new theories need to be developed to know what the
key parameters of our universe are. In the meantime, a way to progress is to
break down the issue into smaller solvable problems. For example, if we want
to tackle the robustness up to the emergence of intelligent life, we can write
a generalized Drake equation ([23], p925) that we call the Cosmic Evolution
Equation:
Nlife(m
∗) = Ng · NS · fS · fp · ne · fl · fi
where Nlife(m
∗) is the number of planets with intelligent life in our particular
universe m∗; and
• Ng is the number of galaxies in the model
• NS is the average number of stars per galaxy
• fS is the fraction of stars suitable for life
• fp is the fraction of such stars with planetary systems
• ne is the mean number of planets which are suitable habitats for life
• fl is the fraction of planets on which life originates
• fi is the fraction of life bearing planets with intelligent life.
There are many implicit assumptions in such a framework, for example that life-
supporting stars will be Sun-like; or that life starts necessarily on planets and
not on more exotic places. We also implicitly assume that the parameters are
independent. To deal with dependent parameters, one would need to introduce
a Bayesian probability framework. Additionally, we may have clear definitions
of what stars or galaxies are, but the issues of defining higher cosmic outcomes
such as life or intelligence remain of huge scientific debate.
The factors Ng and NS can nowadays be estimated, while the recent explo-
sion of exoplanets discoveries is allowing us to estimate more and more precisely
the factors fS · fp ·ne. However, huge uncertainties remain regarding the last two
factors fl · fi.
The main interest of such a framework –whether we consider these seven
factors to be most relevant or others– is that we can in a first approximation
estimate the factors independently. Additionally, the more we progress in our
knowledge of the universe, the larger the distance between factors we can assess.
For example, assessing the number of planets with intelligent life knowing only
the number of galaxies seems very hard. But shorter distances between factors
are easier to assess. For example, Miller’s [40] famous experiment tells us that
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the probability to have amino acids out of a primordial soup and some energy
source is high. Which is indeed an important insight to evaluate ne · fl.
Let us now imagine that we run multiple times a model of our entire universe
m∗. We would be able to interpret the results of the multiple runs of the
simulation as a set of virtual universes. We would end up with a distribution
function f(m∗) combining the probability distributions obtained for each factor.
However, we need to further specify a possibility space, which in this case is M∗
resulting from the variation of random parameters only; and a mathematical
measure pi∗ on M∗. Such a virtual ensemble of simulated universes V would
thus be defined as:
V = {M∗, pi∗, f(m∗)}
The number of planets with intelligent life would then be:
Nlife(m
∗) =
∫
Ng · NS · fS · fp · ne · fl · fi · pi∗
Note that the integral is necessary to normalize the result according to the
measure pi∗ and distribution function f(m∗). There are important and subtle
issues to make this normalization sound and possible (see again[23]).
Let us give some more concrete possible results such simulation studies would
bring. We might conclude that our universe is robust for galaxy-formation, i.e.
most simulation runs lead to galaxy formation. But still, it might turn out that
our universe is not robust for intelligent life, i.e. most simulations do not lead
to the emergence of intelligent life.
We can now take a fresh look on our question: are cosmic outcomes necessary
or contingent? We can define a cosmic outcome as necessary if it appears again
and again as we re-run the same universe simulation, as contingent otherwise.
For example, let us take the DNA code in biology: is it necessary that there
is a unique DNA code for terrestrial or extraterrestrial biology? In a similar
fashion, in economy, is it a necessity in civilizational development that monetary
systems converge to a common currency?
We can also compare the cosmic outcome selections. On the one hand we
would have the ones resulting from “simulation experiments” (see e.g. [32]
for a discussion); and on the other hand the theoretical approaches (such as
Aunger’s). Simulation experiments in cosmology can play the role that empirical
experiments play in other sciences. This approach can be called “cosmology
in silico” or “computational cosmology”. In fact, these endeavors are already
developing quickly, as illustrated by the Virgo Consortium for Cosmological
Supercomputer Simulations.
We have just begun to explore how robust the emergence of complexity in
our universe is. If we want to understand it better, we need to perform computer
simulations and use existing conceptual, mathematical and statistical tools to
design simulation experiments and to assess the results.
However interesting and important this enterprise is, it does not tackle the
fine-tuning issue. Indeed, in studying the robustness of our universe, we try
to understand the emergence of complexity in our universe, whereas to address
fine-tuning we must study the place of our particular universe in the space of
possible universes.
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5 Artificial Cosmogenesis
or the study of alternative cosmic evolutions
Now, we create a considerable problem. For we are tempted to make statements
of comparative reference regarding the properties of our observable Universe
with respect to the alternative universes we can imagine possessing different
values of their foundamental constants. But there is only one Universe; where
do we find the other possible universes against which to compare our own in
order to decide how fortunate it is that all these remarkable coincidences that
are necessary for our own evolution actually exist?
Barrow and Tipler ([6], p6)
you might end up having a future subject which is “comparative universality” –
we have all these laws for the universe that cannot be eliminated as ours and
you study them, you talk about them, you compare them, this could be a future
subject. Students would be required to pass exams on their ten possible favorite
universes ...
Gregory Chaitin ([12], p339)
This first quote by Barrow and Tipler summarizes the core problem of fine-
tuning. The second quote by Chaitin illustrates a core idea towards its resolu-
tion. With the robustness issue, we have focused on our universe. To assess in
how far our universe is fine-tuned, we must study the place of our universe in
the space of possible universes. We call this space the virtual multiverse.
Fine-tuning arguments vary just one parameter, a fallacy which is nearly
always committed. The underlying assumption is that parameters are indepen-
dent. As Stenger ([53], p70) remarks, this is “both dubious and scientifically
shoddy”. If the history of physics learned us something is that phenomena
which where thought to be widely independent, turned out to have common
underlying causes and principles. For example, our common sense fails to see
a connection between the fall of an apple and the tides; magnetism and elec-
tricity; and even less between space, time and the speed of light. But all these
phenomena have been unified thanks to physical theories.
Additionally, varying several parameters without care can lead to what is
known as the one-factor-at-a-time (OAT) paradox in sensitivity analysis. The
problem with the OAT method is that it is non-explorative. Let us see why.
At first sight, it seems logical and rigorous, since it varies factors one-at-a-time
while keeping the others constant. It seems consistent because the output from
a change can be attributed unambiguously to the change of one factor. It also
never detects non-influential factors as relevant. However, by construction, this
method is non-explorative, with exploration decreasing rapidly with the number
of factors. For a simple example, consider Figure 1, which shows clearly that
OAT explores only 5 points forming a cross, out of 9 points in total.
Let us now generalize this example with a geometrical interpretation of the
parameter space. In n-dimensions, the n-cross will necessarily be inscribed in
the n-sphere. The problem is that this n-sphere represents a small percentage of
the total parameter space defined by the n-cube. This is illustrated in Figure 1,
where the cross explored is inscribed in the circle of center [0, 0] and radius 1. In
this 2-dimensional example, the ratio of the partially explored to the total area
–i.e. the square minus the circle– is r ≈ 0.78. The problem gets quickly worse
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[-1, 1]
[-1, 0]
[-1, -1]
[1, 1]
[1, 0]
[1, -1]
[0, 1]
[0, 0]
[0, -1]
Figure 1: The one-factor-at-a-time method can only reach points on the cross. In this
simple two-dimensional parameter space, each discrete factors can only take values 0,
1 or -1. OAT can reach [0, 0], [0, 1], [0,−1] (points on the vertical line); and [-1, 0],
[1, 0] (points on the horizontal line). The points explored are thus on a cross. The
points not explored are the corners [−1, 1], [−1,−1], [1, 1], [1,−1]. In a geometrical
interpretation, note that the cross is by construction inscribed in the circle. But OAT
actually restricts the exploration to points on the cross, not inside the circle because
exploring points inside the circle would imply varying two parameters at the same time.
Now, that cross itself is inscribed in the circle. In sum, OAT restricts the exploration
to the cross, not the circle, but the cross is inscribed in the circle. And this circle
is inscribed in the square (2-cube), which is why OAT can’t reach the corners of the
square.
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as we increase the number of dimensions. In 3 dimensions, r ≈ 0.52 and in 12
dimensions, r ≈ 0.000326 (see [46] for those calculations, as well as critiques
and alternatives to OAT).
Fine-tuning arguments typically vary one parameter at a time. So, they use
the OAT method to explore the space of alternative universes by varying one by
one some of the 31 fundamental physics and cosmic parameters. They actually
explore only r ≈ 4.56·10−15 of the parameter space. We conclude that such fine-
tuning arguments have restricted their exploration to 0.00000000000000456% of
the relevant parameter space!1 Can we hope to explore more of this space? How
can we proceed?
Let us first call a fecund universe a universe generating at least as much com-
plexity as our own. Are fecund universes rare or common in the multiverse?
This is the core issue of fine-tuning. To answer it demands to explore this vir-
tual multiverse. Milan C´irkovic´ [13] and I both converged on this conclusion.
C´irkovic´ used the metaphor of sailing the archipelago of possible universes; I
proposed to perform simulations of possible universes, an endeavor called Artifi-
cial Cosmogenesis (or ACosm, see [62];[64]; and also [60]; [61] for critiques; and
[66] for replies). Such simulations would enable us not only to understand our
own universe (with “real-world modelling”, or processes-as-we-know-them) but
also other possible universes (with “artificial-world modelling”, or processes-as-
they-could-be). We thus need to develop methods, concepts and simulation tools
to explore the space of possible universes (the “cosmic landscape” as Leonard
Susskind [55] calls it in the framework of string theory). In [62], I proposed
to call this new field of research Artificial Cosmogenesis because it sets forth
a “general cosmology”, in analogy with Artificial Life (ALife) which appeared
with the help of computer simulations to enquiry about a “general biology”.
However, recent work on the EvoGrid2 simulation project suggests that the
growth of complexity is more likely to remain open-ended if stochastic, non-
deterministic processing is used at the bottom, instead of deterministic rules,
like in ALife.
Now that we have a framework to define possible universes, we will need
to generalize the Cosmic Evolution Equation we used to assess the robustness
of our universe to explore not only our universe m∗, but also all universes m
element of the wider class of possible universes M . This constitutes a rigorous
approach to assess how fine-tuned our universe is. However, it is important
to understand that the results of such studies would not ipso facto provide an
explanation of fine-tuning. Only if it turns out that our kind of complex universe
is common, then an explanation of fine-tuning would be a principle of fecundity :
“there is no fine-tuning, because intelligent life of some form will emerge under
extremely varied circumstances” ([57], p4).
Most fine-tuning arguments change just one parameter at a time and con-
clude that the resulting universe is not fit for developing complexity. This leads
to the “one-factor-at-a-time” paradox. What if we would change several pa-
rameters at the same time? Systematically exploring the multiple variation
1 I used the formulae in ([46], 1510) for this calculation. Note that this assumes that we
can put upper and lower boundaries on each of the parameters, which is not at all warranted
for physics and cosmic parameters. Note also that this is a very generous estimate, since the
actual exploration of OAT will only be a tiny n-cross within the volume of the n-sphere, which
itself represents only 4.56 · 10−15 of the full parameter space defined by the n-cube.
2http://www.evogrid.org
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of parameters seems like a very cumbersome enterprise. As Gribbin and Rees
wrote ([26], p269):
If we modify the value of one of the fundamental constants, some-
thing invariably goes wrong, leading to a universe that is inhospitable
to life as we know it. When we adjust a second constant in an at-
tempt to fix the problem(s), the result, generally, is to create three
new problems for every one that we “solve”. The conditions in our
universe really do seem to be uniquely suitable for life forms like
ourselves, and perhaps even for any form of organic complexity.
Back in 1991, it indeed seemed very difficult to explore and find alternative
universe. However, a way to overcome this problem is to use computer sim-
ulations to test systematical modifications of parameters’ values. In varying
just one parameter, parameter sensitivity arguments have only begun to ex-
plore possible universes, like a baby wetting his toes for the first time on the
seashore. Surely, we had to start somewhere. But it is truly a tiny exploration.
Furthermore, maybe there is a deep link between the different constants and
physical laws, such that it makes no sense to change just one parameter at a
time. Changing a parameter would automatically perturb other parameters (see
[11], p1581). Fortunately, more recent research have gone much further than
these one-parameter variations.
What happens when we vary multiple parameters? Let us first generalize
the Cosmic Evolution Equation, which this time includes other possible cos-
mic evolutions – notice the plural! Let us imagine that we run multiple times
simulations of different models of universes m. We interpret the results of the
multiple runs of the simulations as a set of virtual universes. We end up with
a distribution function f(m) combining the probability distributions obtained
for each factor of the CEE. Let us mention that, based on modern develop-
ments in computer science, there is another more theoretical way to study and
choose distribution functions for possible universes (see the remarkable study of
Schmidhuber [48]).
The possibility space is the huge M resulting from the definition of possible
universes; and we add a measure pi on M . The resulting ensemble of simulated
universes E would thus be defined as:
E = {M,pi, f(m)}
The number of planets with intelligent life would then be:
Nlife(m) =
∫
Ng · NS · fS · fp · ne · fl · fi · pi
We are now talking about cosmic outcomes in other universes. The topic be-
comes quite speculative, because it is not clear at all which cosmic outcomes are
the most relevant to assess. The factors in the equation above might be totally
irrelevant. What if other possible universes do not generate objects like galax-
ies, stars and planets, but completely different kinds of complex structures?
Nothing that we know may evolve anymore... but other things might! We now
see the fundamental importance to define cosmic outcomes and the emergence
of complexity in a very general manner, so they can also apply to other possi-
ble universes. Bradford [11] proposed such a framework when he wrote about
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sequences of entropy reduction. Aunger’s [3] systems theoretical approach in
terms of energy innovation, organization and control is also a higher-level ap-
proach. Valentin Turchin [58] also proposed a cybernetic theory of complexity
transitions with the central concept of metasystem transition. Theoretical com-
puter science measures such as algorithmic complexity (see e.g. [37]) or logical
depth [8] are also precious tools to assess the complexity of systems in a uni-
versal manner. But these are just a few examples of frameworks to tackle the
general, fascinating and fundamental problems of the evolution and measure of
complexity (see also [7] for a discussion in the context of Artificial Life).
We already saw that higher outcomes fl · fi are harder to assess. This is
precisely where computer simulations can be very helpful. Typically, there are so
many local interactions in the evolution of complex organisms that it is hard to
analyze them analytically with a deterministic science approach. For example,
there is not one single equation which allows to predict the development of an
embryo.
Let us now outline some remarkable alternative complex universes that re-
searchers recently studied. Gordon McCabe studied variations on the standard
model of particles, by changing the geometrical structure of space-time. The
result is not the end of any complexity, but just the beginning of a new set of
elementary particles. McCabe ([38], 2:38) elaborates:
Universes of a different dimension and/or geometrical signature, will
possess a different local symmetry group, and will therefore possess
different sets of possible elementary particles. Moreover, even uni-
verses of the same dimension and geometrical signature will not nec-
essarily possess the same sets of possible particles. To reiterate, the
dimension and geometrical signature merely determines the largest
possible local symmetry group, and universes with different gauge
fields, and different couplings between the gauge fields and matter
fields, will possess different local symmetry groups, and, perforce,
will possess different sets of possible particles.
It thus seems that we can vary basic physics parameters without compromising
all kinds of cosmic evolution. Who knows what kind of complexity can emerge
from this new set of particles?
As an illustration of their framework to define the multiverse, Ellis, Kirchner
and Stoeger [23] did examine some parameter variations in Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-
Robertson-Walker (FLRW) models. They found life-allowing regions in a phase
space described by the evolution of FLRW models. The fact that they found
regions and not a single point in the phase space shows that there is room
for some variation. So it seems that we can vary fundamental geometrical
cosmological parameters without precluding the apparition of life.
Harnik, Kribs and Perez [28] constructed a universe without electroweak in-
teractions called the Weakless Universe. They show that by adjusting standard
model and cosmological parameters, they are able to obtain:
a universe that is remarkably similar to our own. This “Weakless
Universe” has big-bang nucleosynthesis, structure formation, star
formation, stellar burning with a wide range of timescales, stellar
nucleosynthesis up to iron and slightly beyond, and mechanisms
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to disperse heavy elements through type Ia supernovae and stellar
mergers.
This is a truly remarkable result because the cosmic outcomes are numerous,
relatively high and non trivial. Three factors in the CEE are addressed more
or less directly: Ng · NS · fS . Maybe strong living creatures could live in the
weakless universe? This remains to be investigated.
Anthony Aguire [2] did study a class of cosmological models “in which some
or all of the cosmological parameters differ by orders of magnitude from the
values they assume in the standard hot big-bang cosmology, without precluding
in any obvious way the existence of intelligent life.” This study also shows that it
is possible to vary parameters widely without obviously harming the emergence
of complexity as we know it.
Robert Jaffe, Alejandro Jenkins and Itamar Kimchi [31] pursued a detailed
study of possible universes with modified quark masses. They define congenial
worlds the ones in which the quark masses allow organic chemistry. Again, they
found comfortable regions of congeniality.
Fred C. Adams [1] has conducted a parametric survey of stellar stability. He
found that a wide region of the parameter space provides stellar objects with
nuclear fusion. He concludes that the “set of parameters necessary to support
stars are not particularly rare.”
An early attempt to explore alternative universes with simulations has been
proposed by Victor Stenger [51, 52]. He has performed a remarkable simulation
of possible universes. He considers four fundamental constants, the strength of
electromagnetism α; the strong nuclear force αs, and the masses of the electron
and the proton. He then analysed “100 universes in which the values of the four
parameters were generated randomly from a range five orders of magnitude
above to five orders of magnitude below their values in our universe, that is,
over a total range of ten orders of magnitude” [52]. The distribution of stellar
lifetimes in those universes shows that most universes have stars that live long
enough to allow stellar evolution and heavy elements nucleosynthesis. Stenger’s
initial motivation was to refute fine-tuning arguments, which is why he ironically
baptised his simulation “MonkeyGod”. The implicit idea is that even a stupid
monkey playing with cosmic parameters can create as much complexity as God.
In conclusion, other possible universes are also fine-tuned for some sort of
complexity! Those remarkable studies show consistently that alternative com-
plex universes are possible. One might object that such explorations do not
yet assess the higher complexity factors in the CEE. They do not answer the
following key questions: would other interesting complex structures like plan-
etary systems, life, intelligence or technology evolve in those other universes?
However, these are only early attempts in conceptualizing and simulating other
possible universes, and the enterprise is certainly worth pursuing. The fine-
tuning issue could then be seriously tackled, because we would know more and
more precisely the likelihood of having our universe as it is, by comparing it
to other possible universes. Such pioneering studies are just a beginning, and
certainly new studies will come up with more and more complex alternative
universes.
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6 Summary
Let us now summarize the three main steps necessary to assess how fine-tuned
our universe is.
1. Define a space M of possible universes
2. Explore this space
3. Assess the place of our universe in M
Let us review step (1). Our analysis of the historical trends regarding free
parameters [64] invites us to start with a weak variation, i.e. varying free pa-
rameters in physical and cosmological models. Why not vary the laws of physics
themselves? It seems a very cumbersome enterprise, because we do not even
know how to make them vary (see [59]). It can also be dubious to do so, since
the distinction between laws and initial or boundary conditions is fuzzy in cos-
mology [21].
This suggestion to focus on weak variation makes most sense for the following
reasons. First, it is concrete and operational, and has a clear meaning with well
established physics. Second, we assume supernatural miracles happening in the
middle of cosmic evolution to be – by definition – impossible. We assume there
is a consistency and continuity in cosmic evolution. We hypothesize that higher
level parameters are ultimately reducible to these physics and cosmic ones. The
emergent higher levels occur naturalistically. Of course, this remains to be
shown, and for practical purposes we might assume as given such higher level
parameters in our studies and simulations. New levels of emergence, new levels
of complexity did historically emerge from lower levels, even if complicated top-
down causation occurs (see e.g. [22]). Take for example an economic law like the
law of supply and demand. It did not and could not exist before the apparition
of organized human civilizations. It emerged out of such new organizations. It
seems that what we call “natural laws” are simply the result of more and more
regular interactions. For example, as the universe cools down, new organizations
emerge. Again, it is clear that a few billion years ago, there was no economic
laws.
We also need to be more specific to apply probabilities to the ensemble
of possible universes, and avoid probabilistic fallacies. For example, we must
decide, arbitrarily or not, parameter’s upper and lower bounds. This is necessary
for all practical purposes, because we can not explore the parameter space of
all parameters varying from −∞ to +∞. We thus need to define the maximum
deviation allowed for each parameter.
We must beware of one-factor-at-a-time limitations and paradox. We must
also define a probability measure on the parameter space. I refer the reader
to [33] and [23] for detailed arguments that measure-theoretical grounds can
be specified to assess fine-tuning. It is also crucial to define cosmic outcomes
to specify the object of fine-tuning we aim to address. Do we talk about fine-
tuning for nucleosynthesis? atoms? Stars? Life? Intelligence? Or a more
general complexity emergence?
Step (2) requires to explore this space. The simplest exploration is to re-run
the tape of our universe. But this only tackles the issue of the robustness of
the universe. If we want to address the fine-tuning issue we must also run and
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re-run tapes of other possible universes. This will bring us insights into how our
and other universes are parameter sensitive, and generate complex outcomes.
Although we always need good theoretical models to start with, it is necessary
to use computer simulations to explore the huge parameter landscape we are
talking about. That landscape is not just very big, but really huge. Because we
don’t want to and do not have the resources to explore the space blindly, it also
makes most sense to use simulations to test particular hypotheses and theories.
As an application, if we take Lee Smolin’s [49] cosmological natural selection
theory, and find alternative universes with more black holes (the cosmic outcome
under consideration) by tweaking parameters, it is a way to falsify the theory.
The last step (3) is to compare the distribution functions of the cosmic out-
comes obtained through simulations, to the space M of possible universes. In
other words, we assess the probability to find a universe with outcome O. Note
that this is the crucial difference between tackling the robustness and the fine-
tuning issue. In robustness analysis, we run multiple times the same universe
simulation changing only the random dynamical parameters. We compare mul-
tiple runs of the same universe. In fine-tuning analysis, we run multiple different
universe simulations, changing a wide number of parameters. We compare our
universe to the set of possible universes. How typical or atypical is our universe
in the space of possible universes? The results of such simulation experiments
will enable us to answer this question. Ideally, we will be in a position to assess
the likelihood or unlikelihood of complexity emergence in the space of possible
universes. Even better than assessing specific cosmic outcomes, which might
bias us to a universe-centric perspective, we can aim to assess the probability
to find universes which display open-ended evolutionary mechanisms leading to
ever increasingly complex cosmic outcomes.
To the traditionally trained cosmologist, this enterprise might seem totally
unconventional. And it is, because it is a new kind of computational science.
This is why we can call it Artificial Cosmogenesis. It might also seem out of
reach. As I argued elsewhere, since the sheer computational resources grow
more than exponentially, this allows us in principle to increase accordingly the
complexity and richness of our computer simulations [62]. Additionally, engi-
neers and professional model makers have developed a wide variety of tools to
test multiple variables, rarely used in cosmological contexts. Let us just mention
of few of them. A starting point is to use the tools of global sensitivity analy-
sis (see e.g. [45]). These include advanced statistical approaches such as latin
hypercube sampling, multivariate stratified sampling or Montecarlo simulations
for finding dynamic confidence intervals. Systems dynamics and engineering
have also many tools to offer such as phase portraits or probabilistic designs.
The classic book by John D. Sterman [54] remains a reference and quite com-
prehensive introductory book on complex systems modeling and simulations.
Let us now be scrupulous. What is a proof of fine-tuning? Let n be the
number of free parameters. We have a logical and statistical version of what a
proof of fine-tuning would be:
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Logical proof of fine-tuning: If you vary one parameter, there
exists no possible universe generating outcome O by adjusting the
(n− 1) other parameters.
Which is equivalent to:
if you vary one parameter, there is no way whatsoever that any other
possible universe can generate outcome O.
Probabilistic proof of fine-tuning: If you vary one parameter,
adjusting the (n−1) other parameters will not make outcome O more
likely.
Which is equivalent to:
if you vary one parameter, there is no way whatsoever that any other
possible universe can generate outcome O with a higher probability.
In sum, you need to have explored the relevant parameter space of possible
universes to make serious claims about fine-tuning. Pretty hard to prove! This
is even harder for outcomes as advanced as life or intelligence. Our conclusion
is that fine-tuning for life or intelligence remains a conjecture. Like in math-
ematics, we have strong reasons to believe the conjecture is true, but a proof
is out of reach and certainly requires a huge amount of work. As a matter
of fact, the challenge of simulating possible universes and comparing them is
overwhelming. This is why the concept of the cosmic outcome is so important
to ease the process. Indeed, we can break down the problem and progress by
tackling higher and higher outcomes, with more and more connection between
outcomes. We don’t need nor can assess all outcomes at once in the CEE. As
our understanding, modeling capacities and computational resources increase,
we can be more ambitious in simulating more and more as well as higher and
higher outcomes in cosmic evolution. I am well aware of the highly ambitious
research program that ACosm proposes. However, the good news is that there is
work for many generations of scientists. Tomorrow’s cosmology is not restricted
to empirical observations or highly theoretical models. It is also the science of
simulating and experimenting with alternative universes.
7 Conclusion
Up to now, discussions about possible universes were chiefly a metaphysical
recreation. We advanced conceptual foundations to study possible universes
scientifically, with the help of computer simulations. This approach is needed
if we take seriously the thesis of computational irreducibility, namely that most
complex systems are theoretically impossible to predict in a deterministic or
statistical manner. A more general computational kind of science is needed. We
applied this new kind of science to cosmology, to address two key cosmological
issues: the robustness of the emergence of complexity, and the fine-tuning of
the universe.
We first formulated the issues of defining possible universes, and possible
cosmic outcomes (sections 2 and 3). Based on previous work, we defined a
modular “Cosmic Evolution Equation” (CEE). This equation can have many
applications to define research agendas in computational cosmology. In partic-
ular, to tackle our two issues, we adjusted the CEE by varying the space of
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possible universes it acts upon, to study either the robustness (section 4) or the
fine-tuning issue (5).
Importantly, we considered only a virtual multiverse, that we define within
our concrete models and simulations. This is in sharp contrast with speculations
about an actual multiverse, an idea quite common in modern cosmology, yet
often criticized for being hard or impossible to test scientifically.
To address the delicate fine-tuning issue, we further argued that studies
and simulations of alternative possible universes are demanded, a research field
called Artificial Cosmogenesis (ACosm, sections 5-6). This field is actually not
new, since we outlined quite some research which have examined alternative
possible universes. Yet these studies are really just beginning to explore possible
universes, and ACosm holds great promise to further investigate whether and
how our universe and others generate increasing complexity.
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9 Appendix - Argumentative Maps
Figure 2. maps the problem described in introduction, while Figure 3. maps
the core argument presented in the paper. Please read in a top-down direction.
More details on argumentation mapping can be found in [62].
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Figure 2: The core problem
21
Figure 3: The proposed solution
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